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CASE NOTES •
arghment :stating that -action or inaction by the legislature, in 1959 is not
indicative of legislative intent in 1907.1 9
The interpretation of the act as set forth in Gannon has been followed
by- the court in Kiszkan v. The Texas Co'-.5 decided in the same term.
The owner-of the property in that case wag,a lessor and not in possession
ff the :premises. The plaintiff, .a workman employed by an independent
contractor pursuant to a -contract between the contractor and the lessee,
was injured in, a fall from a scaffold. Suit was brought against the lessor-
owner.. At the trial, the lessor was granted-'a summary judgment on the
grounds that it was- not in charge of the work, was not consulted about it
and ,was not a party to the contract. Ho1ding,,that the lessor was a mere
title holder out of possession and therefore notan owner within the mean-
ing of section 9 of the act, the Appellate Court affirmed.
',:.Rejecting the Appellate Court's ratio decidendi and relying instead on
the reasoning 'employed in the .Gannon case, the Supreme Court in affirm-
ing held: "the criterion, according to the plain words of the statute, is
not whether the owner is in or out of possession, but whether the owner
has-charge, of the construction, erection, et cetera, of the designated struc-ture. 'This is the standard imposed by the statute. ..
'49 Ibid.
'.5:0 22 IIl.2d 326, 175 N.E.2d.401 (1961)
51 Id. at 329, 175 N.E.2d at 403.
TORTS-INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF MENTAL
SUFFERING: A NEW TORT IN ILLINOIS
Pl.intiff brought. a civil suit against the convicted murderer of her
Iusband. In her complaint, she alleged that 'the defendant's threat to. kill
her husband together with the fulfillment of. that, threat caused her to
suffer great mental anguish. and nervous exhaustion. It was not alleged
that any 'physical injury resulted. The trial court held that no cause of
'action Was 'stated. The plaintiff appealed directly 'to the Illinois Supreme
Court.1 The Court, after analyzing and evaluating the traditional ration-
'alizations for the refusal to recognize intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a separate tort, concluded that peace of mind is an interest of
sufficient importance to. receive the protection of the law from flagrant,
unreasonable acts of this type. The Supreme Court, in reversing the trial
court, stated that an unwarranted intrusion intended to cause severe emo-
' The constitutionality of the Dram Shop Act, ILL. REV, STAT. ch. 43 §§ 131-35 (1959)
was involved, therefore an appeal directly to the Supreme Court was allowed. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 110 S 75 (1959). " .
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tional distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities and which, in fact does
cause such mental disturbances is now actionable in Illinois. Knierim v.
izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E. 2d 157 (1961).
The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in this case has at least
threefold significance:2 (1) For the first time, Illinois has recognized in-
tentional infliction of mental distress as a separate tort. (2) Illinois by
innuendo is adopting the viewpoint of the Restatement of Torts3 and
will not require bodily harm to recover for this new tort. (3) The opinion
in this case is a good indication of what part Illinois will play in "the
trend today in the United States to give an increasing amount of protec-
tion to the interest in freedom from mental distress."4 To illustrate the
importance of these concepts, it is important to understand the historical
background of this new cause of action.
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to protect one's mental
tranquility in the absence of a special legal relationship 5 or a recognized
tort, such as trespass,6 assault,7 battery,8 false imprisonment,9 invasion of
the right of privacy,1 or malicious prosecution." Many times these torts
were merely technical and the real harm was the mental anguish incurred
by the plaintiff. Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer12 is an example of
a court deliberately finding a technical tort in order to grant relief. In
that case, the defendant's servant had browbeaten and bullied the plain-
tiff in her sickroom, and in leaving threw several coins one of which
2This case also illustrates the concept that law is always in a state of flux. Thomas
Jefferson once wrote: "But I know also that laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opinions changed
with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also and keep pace with
the times. We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when
a boy, as civilized society to remain even under the regimen of their barbarous ances-
tors." Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kerecheval, July 12, 1816, in CuRTIS,
LAW AS LARGE AS LiFE 52 (1959).
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1948 Supp.).
4 Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 302, 106 N.E. 2d 742, 746 (1952).
5 Courts have applied special rules as to the liability of common carriers and others
who undertake to serve the public.
6 Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906); Continental Cas. Co. v. Garrett,
173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1934).
7 Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902).
s Interstate Life & Acc. Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1932).
9 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 756. 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
10 Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 P. 2d 501 (1939); Brents
v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
11 Merriman v. Merriman, 290 Ill. App. 139,8 N.E. 2d 64 (1937).
1256 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937).
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struck her. The court held that this constituted a technical battery and
used this battery as a peg on which to hang damages for the injury to
the plaintiff's feelings.
In. comparatively recent years however, the courts have been faced
with factual situations wherein no recognized tort could be found even
though there was a flagrant, unreasonable act o n the part of the defendant
which resulted in real and substantial damage to the plaintiff. Thus they
were faced with the dilemma-as was the Illinois Supreme Court in this
case-of either recognizing a new tort or denying recovery in a case
where such a denial would have violated common sense. and justice. In
all but a few cases,' 3 the courts have chosen the former of the two al-
ternatives if there was bodily harm.. There is, however a split of opinion
among the courts as to whether or not recovery should be granted where
there is emotional disturbance, unconnected with either contemporaneous
physical injury (bodily harm from without), or consequential physical
injury (bodily injury flowing from the mental anguish). In 1934, the
American Law Institute took the position that there was generally no
liability for emotional distress although it was intentionally, caused. x4
However in 1948 (allegedly in order that a more accurate restatement
of American law might be, given)' 5 the RESTATEMENlT OF TORTS was
amended to recognize, as a separate tort, the intentional infliction of
mental distress. In addition, the Restatement of Torts approved recovery
for emotional distress alone, as well as the bodily harm resulting from
it.16 At the time of the amendment only four states1 7 had allowed re-
covery for emotional distress per se. Since the adoption of the amend-
ment, there has been a definite trend on the part of the courts to recog-
nize a duty to refrain from intentionally causing severe emotional dis-
tress, regardless of whether or not bodily harm results. If we include
18 Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735 (1948); Judevine v. Berzies Mon-
tanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 259 N.W. 295 (1936).
14 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1934).
15 It is interesting to note that the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS listed eight cases to support
this amendment. In one, recovery was given for trespass. Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores
Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936). In another, recovery was based on a battery.
Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937). In two
other cases, the plaintiff recovered for invasion of privacy. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 28 F. Supp. 845 (1939). A fifth case
cited, involved the negligent infliction of mental distress. Klumbach v. Silver Mount
Cemetery Ass'n, 268 N.Y. 525, 198 N.E. 386 (1935). Only three of eight cases cited sup-
ported the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS position.
16 RESTATEMENT, TORTS S 46 (1948 Supp.)
17 Quin v. Roberts, 16 So.2d 558 (La. 1944); LaSalle Extension Univ. v. Fogerty, 126
Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934); Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242
N.WV. 25 (1932); Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W. 2d 428 (1930).
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Illinois, four additional states"s have followed this trend bringing the
total to eight. There are also at least eight courts19 that have said by way
of dicta that they would allow recovery without bodily harm. However,
there are still at least fourteen courts20 that have ruled out recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional disturbance if it is unconnected with
either consequential or contemporaneous physical injury.21 In Harned v.
E-Z Fin. Co.,22 the court held that no cause of action will lie for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress unaccompanied by physical
injury. The defendant's agents in attempting to collect usurious interest
harassed the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that they threatened to
cause the plaintiff to lose his job; that they constantly called his home
at hours when they knew he was sleeping; and that they used vile and
intimidating language when they talked to his wife. The court held that
no recovery could be granted for mental anguish alone since its very
existence can be established only by the testimony of the injured party.
The court concluded that the recognition of this type of tort action
should come from the Legislature.
The underlying reason for requiring contemporaneous or consequential
Is Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E. 2d 157 (1961); Cohen v. Lion Prod. Co., 177
F. Supp. 486 (D.C. Miss. 1959); Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P. 2d 349 (1954); State
Rubbish Collection Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P. 2d 282 (1952).
19 Kuhr Bros. Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 855, 85 S.E. 2d 491 (1954); Crane v. Loftin,
70 So. 2d 574 (1954 Fla.); Frazer v. Morrison, 39 Hawaii 370 (1952); Brown v. Craw-
ford, 296 Ky. 249, 177 S.W. 2d 1; Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113
P. 2d 190 (1941); Saenger Theaters Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86 (1938);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Burton, 104 Ind. App. 576, 12 N.E. 2d 360 (1938); Nickerson v.
Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
20 Geftner v. Rosenthal, 384 Pa. 123, 119 A. 2d 250 (1956); Duty v. General Fin. Co.,
154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W. 2d 64 (1954); Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735
(1948); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135 P. 2d 330 (1943); Orlo v. Connecticut
Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Hinish v. Meir & Frunk Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113
P. 2d 438 (1941); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936);
Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Merchants, 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1939); Walker v. Tucker, 220 Ky. 363, 295 S.W. 138 (1927); Nicholis v. Central Ver-
mont Ry., 94 Vt. 14, 109 Atl. 905 (1919); Brooker v. Silverthorne, 111 S.C. 553, 99 S.E.
350 (1919); Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916); Green v. T. A. Shoe-
maker & Co., 111 Md. 69,73 Ad. 688 (1909); Galzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W.
1003 (1900); Ward v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl. 561 (1900).
21 The courts have not been consistent in their interpretation of what constitutes
physical injury. Symptoms, such as nervousness, loss of weight, and sleeplessness may
be classified as being merely mental by one court and physical by another. These in-
consistencies have led one writer to conclude that the distinction is in reality made
largely on the basis of two factors: 1) The liberality with which the particular court
regards recovery in these situations; 2) The ingenuity and genius of the plaintiff's attor-
ney in forming his pleading and presenting his testimony. For further discussion, see 64
A.L.R. 2d, Emotional Disturbance 100 (1959).
22 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
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physical injury is to prevent a flood of fraudulent litigation,23 and yet
states which have not injected this requirement thus far have been spared
this proverbial deluge. It cannot be contended that defendants will be
defenseless against the allegations of pretentious mental injuries. Justice
House, speaking for a unanimous court in the Knierim case,2 4 pointed
out two safeguards that can be used to effectively deal with the problem.
The first of these two safeguards is the "professional eye. '25 Medical
science is able to detect symptoms which stronger emotions arouse and
thus should be able to offer reasonably credible evidence to distinguish
those plaintiffs deserving relief from the pretenders and malingerers. The
second safeguard is the jurors themselves who "from their own experi-
ence will be able to determine whether outrageous conduct results in
severe emotional disturbance." 26 Where the gravity of the outrage evi-
dences the fact that there has been severe emotional distress neither
feigned nor trivial, is it not absurd to demand bodily harm as additional
proof? In the absence of contrary circumstances, could a jury doubt the
emotional distress of a man threatened with lynching,27 or of a mother
who has been falsely told by officers of the law that her husband and
seven month old daughter were seriously injured 28 or of a wife who has
received a threat that her husband will be murdered? 29
Although in most instances of severe mental disturbance, physical con-
sequences can be found, there are cases in which there is not bodily
harm but, nevertheless, there is real mental damage. To deny legal re-
dress to those who fit into the latter category would be both arbitrary
and unreasonable.
Thus far this discussion has dealt only with the intentional infliction of
mental suffering. Though the decision of the Knierim case dealt only
with intentional aspects of mental suffering, it is a good indication of
how Illinois will participate in the general trend of American courts to
protect individuals from both intentional and negligent infliction of men-
tal anguish. In order to demonstrate this, it is necessary to draw an
analogy between the requirement of bodily injury, used in cases involv-
ing intent and the impact rule as used in cases of negligence. The two
are extremely similar. Each owes its existence to the court's fear of fraud.
23 For a further discussion see Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 40
(1956).
24 Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Il.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
25 Id. at 85, 174 N.E.2d at 164.
26 Ibid.
27 Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137,25 S.W. 2d 428 (1930).
28 Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 222 P.2d 349 (1954).
29 Knierim v. Izzo, 22 IMI. 2d 73, 174 N.E. 2d 157 (1961).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Each has been rejected by the majority of states that have considered the
problem. Each is a harsh rule. Where a court requires either of these
standards and the plaintiff is unable to meet them, judgment is rendered
in favor of the defendant in all cases because there might be fraud in
some cases.
Under the impact rule, a plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the
negligent infliction of mental distress unless there is physical contact.
The rigorous application of the rule is "unjust as well as opposed to ex-
perience and logic."80 Recovery was denied in Boseley v. AndreWs81
where plaintiff suffered a heart attack while fleeing from the defendant's
bull which was trespassing 6n the plaintiff's land. The court held that
the rule was well established in Pennsylvania that there could be no re-
covery for injuries from fright unaccompanied by physical impact and
to adopt a more liberal view "would open a Pandora's box."32
Many courts have held that even trivial contact is sufficient and the
rule seems to have lost most of its effectiveness as a guard against fraud.
The impact rule was satisfied and recovery was granted in Jones v.
Brooklyn Heights R.R.33 The plaintiff in that case was hit on the head
by a small incandescent light bulb which fell from a lamp attached to
the roof of defendant's car.
This rule, requiring impact in cases of negligence is followed by
Illinois8 4 and by thirteen other states.a5 However, it has been rejected in
several states and abandoned by many others that had previously adopted
it; so that today the majority rule8 is that where there is a definite
80 Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 337, 239, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730 (1961).
3' 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
82 1d. at 168, 142 A2d at 266.
83 23 App. Div. 141, 48 N.Y. 914 (1897).
84 West Chicago St. R.R. v. Liebig, 79 111. App. 567 (1899).
a5 Greenburgv. Stanley, 51 N.J. Super. 90,143 A.2d 588 (1958); Potere v.Philadelphia,
380 Pa. 581, 112 A. 2d 100 (1955); Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.
2d 326 (1945); Wheeler v. Balcsti, 304 Mass. 257, 23 N.E. 2d 132 (1939); Boweles v. Max,
159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652
(1923); Stiles v. Pantages Theatre Co., 152 Wash. 626, 279 Pac. 112 (1929); Kentucky
Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W. 2d 272 (1929); Herrick v.
Evening Express Publishing Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Ad. 16 (1921); Miller v. Baltimore &
O.S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908); St. Louis I.M.&S.R.R. v. Bragg, 69
Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (1901); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mass. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899);
Trigg v. St. Louis K.C. & N.R.R., 74 Mo. 147 (1881).
86 Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y. 2d 337, 176 N.E. 2d 729 (1961); Padgett v. Colonial Whole-
sale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E. 2d 265 (1958); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594,
85 N.W. 2d 345 (1957); Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E. 2d 322 (1955);
Kuhr Bros. Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E. 2d 491 (1954); Bell v. St. Louis
S.F.R.R., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61,77 A.2d 923 (1951);
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physical injury produced by extreme emotional distress negligently
caused, the defendant is liable notwithstanding the absence of any physi-
cal impact.
New York, which had previously been one of the staunchest support-
ers of the impact rule, recently repudiated the doctrine in Battalla v.
State.37 The plaintiff, a nine year old child, was sent down a ski lift.with-
out a safety bar through the negligence of the defendant's servant. The
language used in that case bore a striking similarity to that used. in the
Knierim case. The court, as in the Knierim case, decided to rely on
medical science and the jury to "weed out"38 pretenders and malingerers
rather than to apply a harsh rule which bars recovery. In the light of all
these factors, it would seem that the time is right for Illinois and the
other states to abandon the impact rule.
There could be no better way of concluding this note than to quote
a part of this New York decision which overruled a fifty-five year old
precedent. "We act in the finest common law tradition when we adopt
and alter decisional law to produce common sense justice. Legislative
action there could of course be, but we abdicate our own function in a
field peculiarly non-statutory when we refuse to reconsider an old un-
satisfactory court made rule."3 9
Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A. 2d 792 (1950); Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449,
275 N.W. 674 (1937); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prod., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037
(1935); Cashin v. Northern P.R.R., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862 (1934); Bowles v. May,
159 Va. 419, 166 SE. 550 (1932); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 SE. 244
(1924); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918); Strhagen v. Kozel, 40
S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398 (1918); Memphis St. R.R. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W.
902 (1917); Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. V. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159 Pac. 401 (1916); Salmi v. Columbia & N.R.R., 75 Ore.
200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 At. 202 (1907);
Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48
Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
87 10 N.Y.2d 337, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
88 Id. at 242, 176 NE.2d at 732.
891d. at 239, 176 NE.2d at 730, quoting Woods v. Larcet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 103
NE.2d 691, 694 (1952).
